

















































Limit Deciding Dispositions.  
A Metaphysical Symmetry-Breaker 
for the Limit Decision Problem
Florian Fischer 
University of Siegen
There are basically four options to which state the 
limiting instant in a change from one state to its oppo-
site belongs – only the first, only the second, both or 
none. This situation is usually referred to as the limit 
decision problem since all of these options seem trou-
blesome: The first two alleged solutions are asymmet-
ric and thus need something to ground this 
asymmetry in (a symmetry-breaker); while the last two 
options leave the realm of classical logic. I argue that 
including the debate about dispositions enables new 
options for solutions to the temporal limit decision 
problem. Metaphysical considerations function as a 
symmetry-breaker and thus remove the need for a 
non-classical solution. Dispositions bring about the 
changes in the world, so they constitute the meta-
physical background for the instant of change. In par-
ticular, I argue that according to the triadic process 
account of dispositions, the limiting instant belongs to 
the second interval and only the second interval.
LIMIT DECISION PROBLEM MOMENT OF CHANGE 
DISPOSITIONS MANIFESTATIONS PROCESSES
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tence, causation (with a particu-








































































The so-called limit decision problem is a particularly tricky problem in theoretical 
philosophy. It has a long history 1 and is still the subject 
of a lively debate. 2 The temporal version of the limit 
decision problem is often referred to under the head-
ing «the moment of change» and it circles around the 
question of how to describe the change from one state 
to its opposite. Take the well-discussed example of the 
change between rest and motion. 3 Clearly, there is a 
moment when the object in question, say a car, is still 
in rest, and clearly, there is a later moment where it is 
moving. The question is until when exactly the car is 
motionless and from exactly what time on it is in mo-
tion. Is there a first instant of motion? Is there a last in-
stant of rest?
Under the assumption that time is continu-
ous, we can think of the situation in terms of two ad-
joining intervals and the border between them. The 
question then becomes to which interval the border 
belongs. Prima facie, 4 there are four options: the mo-
ment of change belongs to the first interval and only 
the first interval; or it belongs to the second and only 
the second; or it belongs to both; or neither. It is called 
the limit decision problem, since all four options seem 
problematic. The last two options have the problem 
that they seem incompatible with classical logic, aban-
doning the principle of bivalence. Though the first two 
options are compatible with the classical logic, they are 
asymmetric, which raises the question of why the lim-
iting instant should be assigned to the one interval ra-
ther than the other. At this point, it’s not a question 
of logic anymore, i.e., logic cannot decide between the 
first two options.
The paper is structured as follows. In the sec-
ond section, I introduce the limit decision problem for change. I focus on the system-
atic aspects of the exposition of the problem, rather than its history. The asymmetry 
of the possible solutions that are compatible with classical logic brings with it the 
need for something to decide one way or the other. I propose that dispositions can 
function as a symmetry-breaker for these cases. Therefore, I first introduce my fa-
vourite theory of dispositions, the triadic process account of dispositions, in section 
III, and then lay down the implications for the debate about the moment of change 
in the fourth section. In the final section, I take a step back and evaluate the argu-
mentative setup of the paper.
II. The Moment of Change
To begin with, think of any temporal boundary that interests you. Before the bound-
ary one state obtains and afterward another. Whether you fear or anticipate the new 
state or if you are emotionally indifferent, a theoretical question arises regarding the 
1 See Strobach (1998) for an over-
view of the history of the debate 
about the moment of change and 
the systematic answers to it. There, 
Strobach states that «[i]nterestin-
gly, almost every systematically 
conceivable answer concerning the 
moment of change has been argued 
for in the past» (Strobach 1998, 1).
2 See, for example, (Roques et 
al. (2018) for a recent collection 
of essays on the «The Instant of 
Change». The remarkable thing 
about this collection is that they 
include contributions from scho-
lars of the medieval was well con-
temporary debate about limit deci-
sion problem.
3 Although quite prominent, this 
example is problematic because 
it involves the «question of how to 
define rest and motion» (Strobach 
1998, 247). Motion has always been 
a prime example of change itself.
4 The options mentioned here do 
not exhaust the solution space. 
Besides the four options discussed, 
Strobach introduces the either-way-
option: «In a certain respect, the 
old state still obtains at the limiting 
instant, in another respect it does 
not. Moreover, in a certain way the 
new state already obtains at the 
limiting instant, but in another way 
it does not» (Strobach 1998, 6). 
Also, sometimes a mixed descrip-
tion is suggested, as Strobach 
points out, i.e., that there are dif-
ferent sorts of changes that 
require different solutions to the 
limit decision problem. We will 







































































nature of the boundary: which state obtains at the boundary? Already at this level of 
abstraction, it is clear that there are, in principle, four answers. Since both the old and 
the new state can either obtain or not at the border, basic combinatorics yields the 
following four answers.
1. The old state and the old state only obtains at the border
2. The new state and the new state only obtains at the border
3. Both states obtain at the border
4. Neither state obtains at the border
This is the contentual way of framing the temporal limit decision problem. But one 
could also phrase it in terms of intervals. Take two adjoining intervals in the (one-di-
mensional) time continuum. Call the border between them the limiting instance. To 
which interval does the limiting instance belong? Once again, basically, there are four 
solutions.
1'. The limiting instance belongs to the first interval, and to the first interval 
only
2'. The limiting instance belongs to the second interval, and to the second inter-
val only
3'. The limiting instance belongs to both intervals
4'. The limiting instance belongs to neither interval
With the common (Cantorian) distinction between open and closed intervals, we can 
depict the situation more formally. In general, a set of real numbers lying between 
two numbers is an interval. These two numbers are called the extremities of the in-
terval. An interval is called «closed» if it includes its extremities and «open» if it ex-
cludes them. For example, the set of numbers 0 < x ≤ 1 is a left open and right closed 
interval, as it excludes 0 but includes 1. This is depicted as (0,1] or ]0,1].
For our purpose, it only matters what is going on at t1. We can thus oppress 
the left border of the first interval and the right border of the second interval. You 
could set it to an arbitrary number properly smaller (or respectively properly higher) 
than t1, or you could just use −∞ and +∞, respectively. As we are focusing on t1, we 
can also drop the talk of left and right in the context of open and closed. Unless stated 
explicitly otherwise, «open» and «closed» means «open at t1» and «closed at t1», 
respectively.
Now, we can frame the four basic solutions in terms of open and closed 
intervals:
1''. First interval open, second interval closed …t1), [t1…
2''. First interval closed, second interval open …t1], (t1…
3''. Both intervals closed    …t1], [t1…
4''. Both intervals open    …t1), (t1…
To see clearly why the limit decision is called «problematic», let’s look at a simple ex-
ample: a change from rest to motion. Say there is a time t0 (t0 < t1) at which we can 
safely ascribe rest, and then there is later time t2 (t1 < t2) at which we can safely as-
cribe motion. This is not about vagueness, so assume further that the object in ques-
tion, say a car, exemplifies rest up until t1; and motion from t1 on onward. So: REST 







































































Even with this all settled, it is still open what 
property we have to ascribe to t1, 5 i.e., the limit deci-
sion problem still arises. The motion-example helps us 
to see the logical consequences of the different possible 
answers very clearly, so let us list the four basic possi-
bilities, one final time. With R(φ): φ is at rest and M(φ): 
φ is in motion, we can also formalize the four options:
1'''. t1 is at rest and at rest only  R(t1) ⋀ ¬ M(t1)
2'''. t1 is in motion and in motion only ¬ R(t1) ⋀ M(t1)
3'''. t1 is both at rest and in motion  R(t1) ⋀ M(t1)
4'''. t1 is neither at rest nor in motion  ¬ R(t1) ⋀ ¬ M(t1)
The problem, now, is that all four solutions seem troublesome, while it seems like one 
of them has to be chosen. The last two solutions clash with classical logic, while the 
first two threaten to be arbitrary. Let me explicate.
You can easily see that the first two solutions are compatible with classical 
logic. The third and fourth solution, however, seem to 
reject principles at the heart of classical logic. 6 The third 
solution goes against the law of non-contradiction, 
which states that a proposition and its negation cannot 
be true together. The fourth solution goes against the 
law of excluded middle, which states that any prop-
osition is either true or its negation is true. Of course, 
non-classical logics have been developed, and people 
have argued for the third and fourth solution. There is 
a general agreement, however, that the first two solu-
tions would have to be preferred, because they do not 
force a deviation from classical logic.
But the first two solutions also have their problems. Attributing t1 to only 
one of the adjoining intervals brings with it the question of how to decide which of 
the two intervals this is going to be. There need to be some grounds for why the limit-
ing instant should belong to this specific interval. Classical logic only gives us that the 
instant better be assigned to just one interval, not to which one. The first two solu-
tions are, hence, asymmetric – this is why they are compatible with classical logic – 
but they should not be arbitrary (cf. Sorabji 1976, 69). It would be ad hoc to just ran-
domly assign the limit to one of the intervals. The asymmetry needs to be grounded 
in something. I use the terminus technicus «symmetry-breaker» for this.
Summing up, the situation seems to be this: the first and second solution 
are compatible with classical logic; while the third and fourth are not. But the first 
and second solution are asymmetrical solutions, which 
brings with it the need for a symmetry-breaker. 7
Before we go on with my proposal for a sym-
metry-breaker – namely the underlying dispositions, 
which are involved in bringing about the change in 
question – some remarks are in order.
First, the epistemic and the ontological ques-
tion regarding the moment of change need to be kept 
apart. The ontological question is which state or prop-
erty obtains at the limiting instant or to which interval 
5 To be more precise, I would have 
to talk about the car here, since it is 
not the time itself that has the col-
our property. The talk about t1 hav-
ing a colour property should, thus, 
be understood as a shorthand.
6 Some philosophers (e.g., 
Medlin 1963) question the third 
and fourth solution’s incompati-
bility with classical logic. While 
I tend to agree, a discussion of 
this would go beyond the scope 
of this paper. I follow the stand-
ard way of depicting the debate: 
«The first two options seem arbi-
trary, the third goes against the 
law of non-contradiction, and the 
fourth against the law of excluded 
middle» (Roques et al. 2018).
7 You should feel the same compul-
sion to explain why it is explicitly 
this interval as you feel in the case 
of Buridan’s ass. It seems unintelli-
gible that the donkey can choose a 
stack of hay if there are no grounds 
for preferring this particular stack 
over the other. This can be ques-
tioned in the case of Buridan’s ass, 
and someone might think about 
also questioning it in the tempo-
ral limit decision case. Most of the 







































































the border belongs. The epistemic question is, how do 
we get to know this. I am solely occupied with the on-
tological question in this paper. Because of that, there is 
no risk of confusion, and, thus, I can allow myself some 
formulations which might have epistemic connotations.
Second, I explicitly limit the discussion of this paper to temporal limit deci-
sion problems, aka the debate about the moment of change. Consequently, I abstain 
from any claim regarding the implications of my solu-
tions towards other limit decision cases. 8
Third, the symmetry-breaker is not found in 
the mathematical description of the problem alone. 9 
This is a common assumption, which I just want to 
make explicit. Note however, that the temporality of 
the intervals doesn’t help by itself. Sure, time is asym-
metric (future-directed, if you will), but how does this 
asymmetry translate to the limit decision problem?
Summing up, the task is to find an ontological 
symmetry-breaker to enable a classical solution to the 
temporal limit decision problem. This symmetry-break-
er is not found in the (formal) description of the situa-
tion and, thus, we need external input. Obviously, we 
cannot just consider anything as external input; it needs 
to be relevant for the problem at hand. However, look-
ing at the metaphysics of change is not arbitrary – after all, we are concerned with 
the «moment of change». There is a metaphysical debate on how change is brought 
about, and this is the debate about dispositions. I turn to this debate in the next chap-
ter and give a brief account of and a short motivation for my favourite theory of 
dispositions.
III. Dispositions
In this section, I introduce the main aspects of the debate about dispositions required 
to introduce my solution to the problem of the instant of change. Standard exam-
ples of dispositions are fragility and solubility. These dispositions come with canonical 
manifestations: fragility can lead to breaking, and solubility can lead to dissolving. The 
question is, how do dispositions lead to their manifestations? Typically, glass doesn’t 
break for no reason. Only if you strike it with a hammer or throw it to the ground, 
its fragility manifests. And a sugar cube needs to be put into tea or coffee to display 
its solubility. It seems like dispositions need a trigger or 
stimulus to manifest. 10
In a nutshell, the debate about dispositions 
circles around what I like to call the prevented manife-
station problem, i.e., cases where the canonic manifes-
tation is absent. There are tons of examples and coun-
terexamples in the literature. 11 Sometimes the problem 
cases are sorted whether the canonic manifestation is 
prevented by removing the disposition – these cases are 
called «finks»; or whether the canonic manifestation 
does not occur, although the trigger and the disposition 
are present – these cases are called «masks». There is 
need grounds for picking one of 
the first two solutions rather than 
the other, and I will just assume 
this for the context of this paper.
8 For example, Brian Medlin consi-
ders a problem that occurs in the 
context of fracturing a martial body 
(Medlin 1983). Given that no matter 
can be created or destroyed, one 
of the surfaces after the fracture 
should be an open interval and the 
other a closed. But which is which?
9 An external solution, which sur-
passes the mathematical descrip-
tion of the temporal limit deci-
sion problem has the added 
advantage, that, if you disagree 
with the representation of time 
in terms of spatial intervals, as 
Henri Bergson (Bergson 1910, ch. 
2) famously did, you could still 
agree to the TPD-solution regard-
ing the moment of change.
10 It is controversial whether 
all dispositions need a trigger. 
Fundamental dispositions or radi-
oactive decay may be good exam-
ples of trigger-free dispositions. 
I have introduced «trigger-talk», 
because the counterexamples dis-
cussed only arise for disposi-
tions who need a trigger. Note, 
however, that the TPD does not 
exclude trigger-free dispositions.
11   To get a glimpse of the var-
ious kinds of examples used 
in the debate about disposi-
tions, take a look at the «case 







































































general agreement that masking cases are more problematic than finking cases. For 
example, if you take the corresponding antidote, you prevent death through a deadly 
poison. The antidote does neither take away the trigger, as the poison is still ingest-
ed (by a human), nor the dispositions, as the poison is still deadly, but it prevents the 
manifestation nevertheless. Masking cases pose a formidable challenge to any ac-
count of dispositions.
Upon the masking cases, there is a particularly nasty subclass: diachronic 
masking cases (cf. Schrenk 2010, 729). You might think that you could exclude the 
problem cases by making the trigger more explicit. So, instead of «ingestion» you 
could insist that «ingestion in the absence of the corresponding antidotes» is the ap-
propriate trigger for the disposition of the deadly poison. The problem is that this does 
not exclude all prevention cases. Antidotes are often administered after (and, well, be-
cause of) the poison. Call cases where the preventer acts after the trigger «diachronic 
masking cases». As they cannot be fixed by tinkering with the trigger, these cases are 
the hardest problem cases for a theory of dispositions, for systematic reasons.
This tour de force brought us right to the heart of the contemporary dispo-
sitions debate. Of course, I cannot discuss the matter anywhere near exhaustion in 
this context. In the following, I present my theory of dispositions: the triadic process 
account of dispositions (TPD) and hope that my remarks about the diachronic mask-
ing cases at least motivate it. As this paper is concerned with the moment of change, 
I focus on the application of the TPD to this problem 
rather than defending it en detail. 12
The vital bit of the TPD for this paper is the 
process-understanding of disposition manifestations. 13 
Upon reflection, you can see that the diachronic mask-
ing cases are so notorious because they include a time 
gap (Δt) between the stimulus and the canonical man-
ifestation, and because of this temporal gap, «there is 
the in-principle possibility of an interference» (Schrenk, 
2010, 729). Thus, the time span between the ingestion 
of the poison and the death is the core of the problem.
Note, that temporal action at a distance, even 
without the possibility of interference, would be onto-
logically bad. An account that claims that the trigger oc-
curs at t1 and then there is nothing for some time Δt 
followed yet again by a manifestation at t2, should be 
rejected in the first place. However, this is not what’s 
going on in the poison case. With the ingestion, a pro-
cess starts in your body. Sure, the specifics of the pro-
cess depend on the specific poison and specific body, but 
in any case, it is not «nothing». A very clear indicator of 
this is that the poisoning can leave permanent damages to your body, even if the end 
result of the process (death) can be prevented.
So, in the case of the poisoning, there is a process that starts with the inges-
tion, and there is a possible end-result of this process. Not much hinges on this, but I’d 
like to reserve the word manifestation for the process. In this way, it can also be used 
in cases where there is no natural end-point to the process: for example, think of two 
particles in the void, thus charged that they repel each other.
According to the TPD, then, the manifestations of dispositions are to be un-
derstood as processes. This avoids the temporal-action-at-a-distance-criticism: there 
12 I have written a book-length 
introduction and defense of the 
TPD. The TPD consists of two 
parts, which can be understood as 
its synchronous and diachronous 
aspects. The synchronous aspect is 
that it supports a triadic ontology, 
with a third level in-between dispo-
sitions and the resulting behaviour, 
which I called wirkungen. The dia-
chronic aspect is that wirkungen, 
as well as resulting behaviours, 
have to be understood as pro-
cesses. See Fischer (2018, ch. 4).
13 There is some terminological dis-
pute going on in the debate about 
dispositions. Some people use the 
term «manifestation» for what I 
have called resultant behaviour; 
others use the word for my wirkun-
gen. But I don’t want to let this suc-
cumb to a fight about words. As 
the triadic aspect of the ontology is 
not important in the context of this 
paper, I will use the word manifes-
tation indiscriminately. For the offi-







































































is no temporal gap between the process and the trigger. Only the (possible) end of 
the process is temporally separated from the trigger, not its beginning. The process 
understanding of manifestations also offers a solution to the diachronic masking cas-
es. This solution is made possible by the same feature of the TPD that allows it to act 
as a symmetry-breaker regarding the moment of change. I will, hence, discuss it in 
more detail in the next section.
IV. Disposition and the Moment of Change
Let us take stock. In section II, we have said that the solutions 1 and 2 to the tempo-
ral limit decision problem are to be preferred, because they agree with classical logic. 
However, they are asymmetric solutions, and this asymmetry needs to be grounded 
in something. This something can come from outside the mathematics of the contin-
uum, but should, of course, not be something random or ad hoc. But what would be 
more obvious than to look at the metaphysics of change in the context of the debate 
about the moment of change? In section III, we have seen that according to the TPD, 
the manifestations of dispositions are processes. But how does this help with the mo-
ment of change? To see how the TPD can act as a symmetry-breaker, we have to look 
at how the TPD deals with diachronic masking cases.
In a masking case, the manifestation can seemingly be prevented, although 
the trigger and the disposition are present. Diachronic masking cases are especially 
vicious as they allow for the prevention to happen after the trigger. Now, according to 
the TPD, the manifestation is not the end result but the process itself. We have already 
seen that therefore there is no temporal separation between the trigger and manifes-
tation process. But the TPD also ensures that the process cannot be prevented. Let me 
explicate. The idea is that even when the end result is prevented, the process itself is 
not prevented. Remember that in the poison case, a lot of changes in the body of the 
victim happen, some of them irreversible, even if death is prevented.
The process-understanding of manifestations, according to the TPD, is 
closely connected to the progressive aspect. 14 Thus, a 
process is an ongoing entity, i.e., it need not be complet-
ed to have its full identity. From that it follows, that a 
process can be interrupted or even cancelled. Somebody 
can be walking to the university without ever reaching 
the university (maybe because she is struck by light-
ning, maybe something more mundane happens). The 
important thing is that there is an ongoing process 
that may or may not be completed; depending on the 
circumstances.
And in turn, this means that, actually, there is no diachronic masking prob-
lem. The manifestation process is there, even if it is interfered with or cancelled. Hence, 
the diachronic masking problem is a conceptual misunderstanding. It just arose, be-
cause people were focusing 15 on the end result rather 
than the process that leads to it. It didn’t reach its ca-
nonical end result, but the disposition nevertheless was 
manifesting. Of course, the manifestation can still be 
prevented. If you take away the trigger or the disposi-
tion, no manifestation occurs. Yet, this is no wonder and 
not problematic. If I do not strike the glass (no trigger) 
or if I harden it to make it shatterproof (no disposition, 
14 There are other understand-
ings of processes, but I’m explic-
itly only considered with this one. 
When push comes to shove, I stick 
with «progressive» rather than with 
«process» to describe my account. 
It is because of this understanding 
that I don’t think that processes are 
essentially temporally extended.
15 It would exceed the limitations 
of this paper, but there is a story in 
the background on how the focus 
of the debate about dispositions 
ended up being on the result rather 
than the process. Roughly this 
has to do with the humean ontol-
ogy, which is implicitly or explicitly 
assumed in the debate. For more 







































































that is fragility), of course, the glass does not break. But if the disposition is kept, as 
soon as the trigger there, the manifestation process starts.
Thus, one could simply define the trigger as the beginning of the manifes-
tation process. To be precise, with «the beginning» I do not mean its initial stage but 
that it begins. Hence, it is conceptually impossible that the manifestation (process) 
is prevented – and thus, the diachronic masking problem is a conceptual misunder-
standing. All of this might be controversial. Yet all we need for the problem at hand is 
that the manifestation (process) begins when the disposition is triggered.
Let us take this to the limit. For the prevention of the manifestation to be 
conceptually impossible, the manifestation process needs to be present no matter 
how short a time elapsed. If we (in thought) push the interruption closer and closer 
to the trigger, we see that the manifestation process must start with a closed interval. 
There needs to be a first moment of the manifested, because otherwise a mask would 
still be (conceptually) possible. 16
Now, it doesn’t matter (here) whether you 
take this to be a viable solution to the diachronic mask-
ing problem or not. It should be clear, however, how this 
is supposed to help in the case of the temporal limit de-
cision problem. But let’s be explicit.
The two intervals in question need to have 
some qualitative difference, otherwise they would not 
be two. No limit, no limit decisions problem. But this 
qualitative difference, a dispositionalist would say, is 
due to (some kind of change): no change, no moment of 
change. So how would the situation be described in the 
terms of the metaphysics of change, according to the TPD? At t1 there is a change 
happening. A previously unmanifested disposition is manifesting. It might be for a 
short while only, but at t1 it is manifesting. Thus, the border belongs to the second in-
terval and the second interval only.
Let us discuss this for a moment. First, note that the argument in favour of 
the second solution via this route consists of two steps. The first step would be the 
argument for the TPD itself – which we have omitted in this paper. The second step is 
the translation from the TPD to the temporal limit decision problem. Of course, this 
second step is open to criticism. I have claimed that the manifestation (process) of a 
disposition has to start with a closed interval because of the diachronic masking cas-
es. One could accept this but reject that this favours the second solution to the tem-
poral limit decision problem.
And in fact, I find it plausible that the TPD is, in principle, compatible with 
the third and fourth solution. The idea is that the manifestation and the change in 
property could come apart. Think about the change from rest to motion. The TPD 
only enforces that t1 is the first moment of the manifestation, not necessarily that 
it’s the first moment of motion. Nothing in the TPD forbids that at t1 the object in 
question is neither at rest nor in motion, or that it is at rest and in motion at t1. For, 
if you have no problem with accepting truth value gaps or gluts, you could still hold 
the TPD. Still, it is much more natural to pair the TPD with the second solution. How 
to pair it with the first solution, I cannot see.
An additional way to challenge the second step would be the claim that 
the TPD is irrelevant for the limit decision problem. 17 
The worry is that considering the manifestations of 
dispositions is changing the subject, especially as the 
16 The TPD surely is a minority 
position. Among other things, it 
features the claim that the mani-
festation of powers is synchronic 
with the trigger. This is very con-
troversial (see e.g., Williams 2019; 
Maslen 2018 for objections to it), 
but that is precisely the point. Only 
because of those «strange» fea-
tures, the TPD is able to have an 
impact on the debate about the 
debate about the limit decision 
problem. Not any theory of dispo-
sitions and processes would do.
17 I would like to thank 








































































(potential) end products of (manifestation) processes and the (manifestation) pro-
cesses themselves have to be distinguished according to the TPD. To dissolve this wor-
ry, it is important that we need to be very careful, which dispositions and according-
ly which manifestation processes we track. The limit decision problem only arises for 
adjacent states. Thus, whether the process is already in the state of its end result, say 
whether a breaking glass is already broken, is irrelevant for the question at hand. The 
limiting instance is between the unbroken and the breaking. The relevant questions 
are: is there a last moment of the unbroken, and is there a first moment of breaking? 
And to these questions, the TPD has a definite answer.
There is another potential point of critique for the second step of my argu-
ment. In my exposition of the temporal limit decision problem in section II, I have as-
sumed that the four different formulations of the problem are equivalent. But they 
might not be. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe, for example, argues that the temporal question 
and the ontic question regarding the limit decision problem have to be kept strict-
ly apart. «On the one hand, one can ask about the limit of the time that measures a 
state» and «[o]n the other hand, one can ask about the limit of the state» (Pérez-
Ilzarbe 2012, 292).
A challenger to my argument could try to object that I only give a solution 
to one of the questions, either the temporal or the ontic, not the other. But if you 
grant the transmission from the metaphysics of disposition manifestations to the 
temporal limit decision problem in the first place, I can’t see why there should be pri-
ma facie a stronger link for any of the two questions.
The combination of the two worries, the compatibility of the TPD with the 
non-classical solutions and the differentiation of the temporal and the ontic question, 
give rise to a fall-back option for my argument. The idea is the following. Accepting 
that the temporal and the ontic question are (partly) independent of each other, i.e., 
that the question to which interval the temporal instance belongs can have a differ-
ent answer than the question which state obtains at the border, opens up the pos-
sibility of an interesting, complex answer to the limit decision problem. In particu-
lar, it allows to combine a symmetric solution regarding the properties involved with 
an asymmetric solution regarding the temporal instance. This, in turn, shows that 
accepting a truth value gap or a contradiction regarding the motion at t1, does not 
settle the temporal question. And then, the TPD still gives us good reasons for an 
asymmetrical solution to the temporal question, namely the second solution, that the 
temporal border belongs to the second interval and the second interval only.
Another issue worth discussing is the generality of the TPD solution. Does it 
hold that every temporal limit decision case has to be treated in the same way? I have 
based the asymmetry of the solution on the metaphysical asymmetry of disposition 
manifestation. I have argued that considering dispositions regarding the moment of 
change is not arbitrary, because dispositions are intimately involved in bringing about 
changes in the world. But do all changes involve dispositions? So even if one agrees 
that dispositions are involved in some changes and finds my examples convincing, 
one could still reject that (the same kind of) dispositions are involved in all changes.
At this point, there are two options: either being a pan dispositionalist or de-
fending a mixed description. If you are a pan dispositionalist, you straight up reject 
the worry. Pan dispositionalists believe that every property is essentially disposition-
al. All changes in the world involve dispositions, and thus, the generality of the TPD is 
not limited. The other option is what Strobach calls a mixed description, namely that 
there are «different options for different cases» (Strobach 1998, 12). The TPD would 







































































that the other cases coincidentally also happen to support the second solution; but 
the generality of the TPD is restricted.
The last thing I want to discuss is the possible difference between the begin-
ning and the end of a process. One could argue that there is a metaphysical difference 
between the beginning and the end of a process and that I have only spoken about 
the beginning. This is a different kind of attack to the generality of the TPD solution. It 
seems like you can accept everything I have argued for and still hold that the TPD only 
covers half of the cases. Reconsider the car, which is first in rest than in motion. Now 
also assume that it comes to rest again after a short period of motion. In this exam-
ple, there are two interesting limits, the first between the initial rest and the motion; 
the second between the motion and the later rest. The objection would be that I have 
given only an account of the first instance.
First, I want to point out that this worry does not challenge the TPD solu-
tion itself but merely its generality. So, one option would be to just bite the bullet and 
accept that the TPD just gives us half of the picture. But maybe we can have more.
Why should we accept the asymmetry between beginnings and ends of 
processes in the first place? The moving car has the disposition to stop. You can stop 
it by jamming on the breaks, or it can be stopped in a more unpleasant way by guard 
rails. We have already given an account about the change from unmanifested to man-
ifesting: the TPD says that there is a first moment of the manifestation process, and 
hence the second solution is to be also applied in this case. So, the «end» of the one 
process actually is the beginning of another process.
If this reply is sensible, one could try to draw implications regarding the 
fundamentality of different kinds of changes from it. Strobach distinguishes succes-
sions, or: s-changes and Cambridge-, or: C-changes (Strobach 1998, 2). According 
to Strobach, an s-change takes place between two positive states, e.g., between rest 
and motion; while C-changes consist in the beginning or ending of one positive state. 
Strobach, rightly, points out that «[e]very s-change consists of two C-changes: the 
ending of the old and the beginning of the new state».
This, in itself, does not imply anything about the fundamentality of the kinds 
of changes. But if I’m right that the end of a process has to be understood as the be-
ginning of a new process, then the two C-changes involved are not on a par. And this, 
in turn, suggests that C-changes are ontologically more fundamental than s-chang-
es. The picture is this: we have beginnings of processes (via dispositions manifesting), 
but each beginning is also the ending of an incompatible process. So, each beginning 
of motion is also the end of rest, and both together then is the s-change from motion 
to rest; while each beginning of rest is also the end of motion, and both together con-
stitute the s-change from rest to motion.
This concludes my discussion of the TPD solution to the temporal limit deci-
sion problem. Its core – that disposition function as metaphysical symmetry-breaker 
that favour the second solution, namely that the limit always belongs to the new – is 
relatively independent of the more speculative considerations at the end of this sec-
tion. However, I think it all amounts to a nice overall picture. Let us now take a step 
back and assess the argumentative setup of my account.
V. Conclusion 
I have argued that the TPD allows for a solution to the temporal limit decision prob-
lem; but I did not argue for the TPD in this paper, so it might seem that the whole ar-







































































more general than just the TPD. I wanted to show that the debate about dispositions 
is relevant to the debate about the temporal limit decision problem. Regarding this 
goal, the TPD only was an example with whose help I wanted to show how the de-
bate about dispositions can influence the debate about the moment of change. If my 
argument was convincing, the claim that dispositions can be the symmetry-breaker 
is established. Furthermore, I don’t know of any other attempt to take a specific the-
ory of dispositions to have implications for the limit decision problem, let alone of any 
other account of dispositions that could potentially be used. It is the specific under-
standing of manifestations as processes of the TPD that enabled the transmission to 
the temporal limit decision problem – and this is unique, as far as I know. As long as 
there is no other contender, the TPD and with it the debate about dispositions speaks 
in favour of the second solution: the limiting instance belongs to the second and only 
the second interval.
But the whole argument can also be read the other way around: that it al-
lows for a novel kind of solution to the temporal limit decision problem, speaks in fa-
vour of the TPD. It is quite a widespread view to think of 
philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits. 18 
Given stable costs, the more application cases a theo-
ry has, the more profitable it is. Thus, according to the 
motto «one person’s modus ponens is another person’s 
modus tollens» the solution to the temporal limit deci-
sion problem is an argument in favour of the TPD. 19
Of course, I do not claim to have solved the 
limit decision problem once and for all. All I wanted to 
show was that dispositions allow for a new argument 
in favour of one of the classical solutions. I hope this will 
be seen as an advantage by the people who think that 
we should only accept gaps or gluts if there is no clas-
sical solution. My solution would need to be contrasted 
with the other available solutions in the next step. But 
this transcends this paper by far. In a nutshell, my goal 
in this paper was not to try and solve the limit decision 
problem but to enrich its solution space.
18 I don’t think this is the right 
way to evaluate philosophical the-
ories. I side with John Heil, who 
campaigns against the misuse of 
Occam’s razor in philosophy (Heil, 
2012, 97). Used too early in theoriz-
ing, Occam’s razor can turn into a 
straitjacket and hinder the captur-
ing of the complexity of the world. 
My ontological preference rather 
matches what James Ladyman and 
Don Ross have called Rainforest 
Realism. «Ours is thus a realism of 
lush and leafy spaces rather than 
deserts, with science regularly 
revealing new thickets of canopy. 
Anyone is welcome to go on shar-
ing Quine’s aesthetic appreciation 
of deserts, but we think the facts 
now suggest that we must recon-
cile ourselves to live in the rain-
forest» (Ladyman et al. 2007, 234).
19 So, for example, I cannot see 
how a (neo-)humean theory of 
change can be a symmetry-breaker 
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